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Given its vast land resources and favorable water supply, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC’s) 
natural agricultural potential is immense. However, the economic potential of the sector is handicapped 
by one of the most dilapidated transport systems in the developing world (World Bank 2006). Road 
investments are therefore a high priority in the government’s investment plans and those of its major 
donors. Although these are encouraging signs, very little is known about how the existing road network 
constrains agricultural and rural development, and how proposed new road investments would address 
these constraints. To inform this issue, the present paper primarily employs geographic information 
system (GIS)-based data to assess the impact of market access on agricultural and rural development in 
the DRC. Compared to existing work, however, the paper employs a number of innovations to improve 
and extend the generic techniques used to estimate the importance of market access for agricultural and 
rural development. We then use our derived results to run simulations of how proposed infrastructure 
investments would affect market access, and how market access would in turn affect agricultural 
production and household wealth. We find highly significant and negative elasticities between travel 
times to sizable cities (50,000 or 100,000 population), although we also find that these elasticities are 
small relative to those of similar cross-country tests. Moreover, city access by itself is less important than 
access to cities and ports. This finding strongly suggests that increasing investment in ports in the DRC 
should be a priority in the infrastructure investment portfolio.  
Keywords: Democratic Republic of Congo, infrastructure, market access, road and river transport, 
agricultural production, poverty  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The agricultural potential in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is immense. By one back-of-the-
envelope calculation, if yields in the DRC’s 80 million hectares of arable land were to catch up to the 
global technological frontier, the country could feed around one-third of the world’s population.
1
Table 1. Key indicators of the state of agriculture and welfare in the DRC 
 But 
sheer biophysical potential is not the same as economic potential. Decades of conflict, corruption, and 
economic mismanagement have severely weakened the socioeconomic base of the country. Between 1960 
and 2001, the DRC experienced the largest economic decline in the world (less than -3 percent GDP 
growth per year), and the vast agricultural sector—which employs over three-quarters of the population—
has suffered particularly badly. Agricultural exports declined from 40 percent of all exports in 1960 to 
only 10 percent in 2000, and the food surplus per person declined by an astonishing 30 percent between 
1975 and 2000. Around two-thirds of the country lives on less than US$1 per day, at least 70 percent face 
food insecurity of some sort while 16 million people suffer from chronic malnutrition, crop yields are a 
minuscule fraction of their potential, and the country imports around one-quarter of its cereal 
consumption. Yet, paradoxically, agriculture’s share in gross domestic product (GDP) has actually 
increased because of the declining mining and manufacturing, so the usual path of structural 
transformation has been reversed. In short, the DRC is a severely depressed economy in which the vast 
majority of the population survives in a subsistence agricultural economy (see key indicators in Table 1). 




a (1–100)  25.1  24.4  8.9  14.0  24.8  7.8 
Net agricultural exports
b (% total 
imports) 
-4.2  15.3  13.0  10.2  -2.0  -4.7 
Net food exports
b (% imports)
  -7.3  -2.7  5.6  1.0  -1.7  -2.8 
Cereal imports
c (% cereal consumption)  27.0  37.5  44.2  16.4  10.0  49.4 
GDP per capita
d (2000 international 
dollars) 
272  2,309  7,432  4,548  2,079  5,547 
Rural population
d (% total)
  67.3  62.0  35.2  61.4  75.8  40.5 
Source: a. von Grebmer et al. (2008); b. Aksoy and Dik-melik (2008); c. FAO (2008); d. World Bank (2006) 
Notes: Only low- and middle-income countries are included. LATAC is Latin America and the Caribbean, and MENA is the 
Middle East and North Africa. “Africa” refers only to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Despite being the third-largest country in Africa and one of the poorest, the question of how to 
reverse decades of economic stagnation in the DRC is one that the research community has scarcely 
touched upon. Although we know that agriculture is important even in mineral-rich economies (e.g., 
Indonesia, Chile, and Nigeria), achieving agricultural growth requires not only a range of investments in 
agriculture (research and development, extension services, irrigation projects, input distribution policies, 
etc.) but also investments for agriculture. In the case of the DRC, we argue that it is actually an 
investment for agriculture—rural roads—that is currently the binding constraint on agricultural growth. 
Our reasoning is quite simple. First, a range of studies have demonstrated that roads are extremely 
important for agricultural development (see Van de Walle 2002), and that weak transport infrastructure is 
an especially severe constraint across much of Africa. Second, transport infrastructure in the DRC is 
                                                       
1 Eric Tollens, professor and agronomist at the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, quoted by La Voix du Congo 
Profond, the magazine of the Belgian Development Cooperation, Issue No. 4, pp. 32–33.  
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particularly weak (Minten and Kyle 1999; World Bank 2006). Figure 1 shows the percentage of the 
population estimated to be within five hours’ drive of a 50,000-person town. The DRC has one of the 
lowest “market access” scores in Africa, and we will suggest below that these estimates almost certainly 
overestimate market access on the ground. For one thing, many roads in the DRC are roads in name only, 
and survey evidence suggests that transport times are also increased by around 40 percent in the wet 
season, which in the DRC lasts for almost half the year.  
Finally, as our title suggests, rural roads are somewhat unique in terms of their capacity to 
literally pave the way for other investments, such as schools, health services, and security services (AITD 
and UNESCAP 2000; Fan 2008). In agriculture, better roads can drastically reduce the cost of inputs such 
as fertilizers, seeds, and extension services (Ali and Pernia 2003; Gregory and Bumb 2006; Ahmed and 
Hossain 1990; Cicera and Arndt 2008; Dercon et al. 2008). On the output side, better roads increase the 
scope of profitable trade, which in turn encourages on-farm investments to raise agricultural production 
(Binswanger, Khandker, and Rosenzweig 1993; Khachatryan et al. 2005). This in turn should raise rural 
incomes, lower food prices (and hence raise disposable incomes in urban areas), reduce spatial disparity 
in food prices, and reduce dependence on food imports. Hence, better rural roads increase net returns to 
other worthy investments in both the farm and nonfarm sectors. 
Figure 1. GIS-based estimates of market access in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: DRC=Democratic Republic of Congo. CAR=Central African Republic.. 
 






















Population (%) within 5 hrs of 50,000 person town 
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It is also reassuring to note that we are by no means alone in identifying infrastructure as a severe 
bottleneck in the DRC’s development, particularly with regard to agricultural growth. A recent World 
Bank review attributes the decapitalization of the DRC’s agricultural sector to the collapse of the 
country’s infrastructure network and identifies infrastructure investments as one of the four critical policy 
goals for the sector. The DRC government and its donors have likewise identified infrastructure as a 
priority sector. The World Bank and British government have signed a five-year agreement for the 
rehabilitation and upgrading of 1,800 kilometers of high-priority roads. These projects have already made 
it possible to open 4,200 kilometers of roads and will thus make it possible to cover more than 40 percent 
of the 15,000 kilometers of roads that have been identified as priority investments in the DRC. Finally, 
China is now becoming a major international investor in the DRC. The financial crisis and political 
tensions with traditional donors there have led to substantial delays in the negotiations between the DRC 
and China, but as of mid-2009 China’s road investments are once again going ahead. If indeed they do 
proceed, the partnership would constitute one of the largest infrastructure investments in African history, 
including around 5,800 kilometers of road rehabilitations and an equally long railway network.  
Although these infrastructure investments in principle address a binding constraint on the DRC’s 
economy, they also involve risks. First, debt-funded investments need to generate high returns in order to 
offset the debt burden. Second, infrastructure may be a generic solution to the DRC’s problem, but the 
spatial allocation of infrastructure investments might significantly determine their broader socioeconomic 
impact. Africa as a whole has a checkered history in which infrastructure investments—including colonial 
investments—often served extractive industries rather than agriculture. Given the DRC’s vast mineral 
wealth, the possibility that roads could serve the mineral sector well but again bypass agriculture is very 
real. Hence, in addition to gauging the relationship between roads and agricultural development in the 
DRC, we also go one step further in using those results to simulate the impacts of the recent infrastructure 
proposals on agricultural production.  
The methods by which we do so build on existing techniques, although we extend and adapt these 
techniques in several ways (Section 2). First, we follow the burgeoning “GIS literature” in estimating 
market access based on imposing simple travel-time assumptions on geo-referenced maps of the DRC 
road network, as we did for the statistics in Figure 1. However, because these assumptions are derived 
from generic travel-time assumptions rather DRC-specific assumptions, we adapt the estimates to the 
DRC’s circumstances using survey-based travel-time estimates from Minten and Kyle (1999). We then 
re-estimate the likely impact of the DRC’s planned infrastructure investments on market access across the 
country, as well as other scenarios such as a “transport network” investment strategy and a comprehensive 
“rural feeder road” strategy. Section 2 also outlines our methodologies for estimating crop production 
potential, actual crop production, and population density. 
In Section 3 we look at the relationship between infrastructure and poverty using the 2007 
Demographic Health Survey (DHS) for the DRC. This allows us to get a sense of how infrastructure–
poverty linkages vary over different regions in the DRC, as well as over the agricultural and 
nonagricultural populations. In Section 4 we look at the more specific relationship between agricultural 
production and market access using the methodology described in Section 2. To begin with, we 
econometrically estimate the impact of market access on crop production, following Dorosh et al. (2009). 
Finally, in Section 5, these various elasticities between market access and welfare outcomes are used to 
simulate the impacts of alternative road investment strategies, including the current proposals of the DRC 
government and its development partners. Section 6 provides a concluding discussion.  
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2.  METHODS 
In this section we outline the methods use to construct a geospatial dataset that includes crop production, 
a measure of market access that effectively links population distribution with transport infrastructure and 
terrain characteristics, and a measure of agroclimatic crop suitability that accounts for the biophysical 
potential of physical areas in terms of soil and climatic suitability. We then discuss our econometric 
strategy for establishing the relationships between these variables.  
2.1. Population Data in the DRC and Local Market Access 
In the DRC there were previously 11 provinces, although these were broken up into 26 provinces in 2006. 
However, many of the statistics and discussions in subsequent sections utilize the original 11 provinces, 
so Figure 2 provides a reference to the locations of these provinces and the major cities listed in Table 2. 
Figure 2 shows the locations of these cities and the “old” provincial boundaries (bolder lines) as well as 
the new provinces (gray lines) and territories (faint gray lines).  
The total population of the DRC is not known very precisely, but in 2009 the United Nations 
estimated the population at 66 million, having increased rapidly, despite the war, from 46.7 million in 
1997. The urban population is estimated to be around 30 percent, and the DRC is estimated to have the 
third youngest population in the world, with a median age of just 16.5. The largest cities in the DRC are 
listed in Table 2. With three cities of over 1 million inhabitants, urban markets in the DRC are certainly 
large, although urban agriculture is also not unknown. Kinshasa, with over 7 million people, is 
undoubtedly a large market and is a major destination for agriculture produce from neighboring provinces 
such as Bandundu. As for the old provinces, most have 3–6 million people, with Bandundu, Orientale, 
Equateur, and Katanga being the most populous. However, more recent data on the 26 new provinces 
suggest that Kinshasa and North and South Kivu are now the most populous provinces. 
Table 2. City sizes in the DRC, 2008 
City  Population  City  Population 
Kinshasa  7,273,947  Kolwezi  456,446 
Lubumbashi  1,283,380  Likasi  367,219 
Mbuji-Mayi  1,213,726  Tshikapa  366,503 
Kananga  720,362  Kikwit  294,210 
Kisangani  682,599  Mbandaka  262,814 
Bukavu  471,789     
Source: UN (2009).  
  
5 
Figure 2. A political reference map 
 
Old provinces   New provinces   Territories 
For a more disaggregated measurement of rural and urban populations, we identify the nearest 
city and its population size using the Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project (GRUMP) population data 
from the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN).
2
   
 These population counts 
for the year 2000 were adjusted to match United Nations (UN) totals, and the resulting population 
estimates for territories (the fourth tier of government in the DRC) are presented in Figure 3.  
                                                       
2 Specifically, it is the Gridded Population of the World, Version 3, with Urban Reallocation (GPW-UR).  
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Figure 3. Total population by territories  Figure 4. Population density 
   
We then combined friction grids and the locations of cities with different sizes, and calculated 
travel time to the nearest town or city of (i) 50,000 people or more, (ii) 100,000 people or more, and (iii) 
200,000 people or more. For the details, see Thomas (2007).
3 In addition to defining markets on the basis 
of town or city size as we do below—e.g., 50,000- or 100,000-person towns—we also follow Dorosh et 
al. (2009) in considering local market size, since this may also influence crop production. There is no 
consensus on defining the boundary or size of local markets (or a market potential measure), but a 
standard method is to use a distance decay model in which the weight attached to population aggregates 
decay as distance increases.
4
    (1) 
 Thus, local market size is calculated as: 
where popk is the population aggregate in neighboring area k and the distance weight is wk,j =1/(dk,i) 
γ 
where dk,i is the Euclidean distance between k and i in kilometers and γ is an arbitrary decay parameter. 
Following Dorosh et al. we use two proxy variables: (i) a population count in its own pixel and (ii) a 
distance-weighted population aggregate in neighboring areas within a 100-kilometer radius (excluding its 
own population). We divide these areas into six subgroups (radius 1–2 km, 2–5 km, 5–10 km, 10–20 km, 
20–50 km, and 50–100 km). The input data are from the GRUMP population counts in year 2000 at 1-
kilometer resolution. 
Figure 4 shows our results. As expected, population density in the DRC is extremely low, with 
much of the country being characterized by the lowest two categories of density (less than 25 people per 
square kilometer). The densest populations are found in North and South Kivu and Ituri in the east of the 
country, and in and around Kinshasa in the west. Population density in parts of Bandundu, Equateur, and 
Kasai is also moderately high. 
                                                       
3 Details of the calculations for Mozambique are given in Dorosh and Schmidt (2008). 
4 See Deichmann (1997) for a review of the issues related to this methodology. 
∑ =
k
k i k pop w , i size market    local 
7 
2.2. Estimating Agroclimatic Crop Suitability 
Different crops have different thermal, moisture, and soil requirements, particularly under rainfed 
conditions. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), with the collaboration 
of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), has developed the Agro-Ecological 
Zones (AEZ) methodology on the basis of an inventory of land resources and evaluation of biophysical 
limitations and potentials. The AEZ methodology provides a standardized framework for the 
characterization of climate, soil, and terrain conditions relevant to agricultural production. Crop modeling 
and environmental matching procedures are used to identify the crop-specific limitations of prevailing 
climate, soil, and terrain resources, under different levels of inputs and management conditions. This 
methodology also provides maximum potential and agronomically attainable crop yields and suitable crop 
areas for basic land resource units (usually grid cells in the recent digital databases) (Fischer et al. 2001; 
FAO 2003).  
In this paper we measure potential yields for each of three production systems: irrigated—high 
input (we simply call it “irrigated”), rainfed—high input, and rainfed—low input. Then for each of the 
three input levels, we define the land suitability by crop based on four classes: very suitable, suitable, 
moderately suitable, and marginally suitable. Finally, the potential yield is calculated as the area-weighted 
average of the above four suitable classes (FAO 1981; FAO 2003).
5
   
 To summarize, the agroclimatic crop 
suitability of a geographical area is a function of three factors: (1) the production system, (2) the crop 
mix, and (3) the suitability of the land for that crop mix. An important point to note is that factors (2) and 
(3) are essentially directly estimated from location-specific data, whereas the production system (1) is not. 
The potential gross revenue for a crop at a certain location (i.e., a 10 km x 10 km pixel in this paper) is 
calculated by multiplying suitable area, potential yield, and crop price. As the same location may be 
suitable for growing multiple crops, we define the potential crop production by summing up the potential 
gross revenues of all suitable crops at this location. Figure 5 shows such crop potential under both high-
input and low-input rainfed conditions. In the DRC, we know that there is very little use of irrigation or 
modern inputs: FAO data for the pre–civil war period of the 1990s suggest that there were about 0.2 
tractors per 1,000 agricultural workers, US$0.20 worth of modern fertilizers per worker per year, and 
irrigation of just over 0.1 percent of the land area. Hence the most plausible measure of agroclimatic crop 
suitability is one based on the low-input rainfed technology (Panel A, Figure 5). Figure 5 shows that the 
areas of highest potential are Kasai Occidental in the south-central part of the DRC and Equateur in the 
northwest, while there is more moderate potential in Bandundu in the southwest (bordering Kinshasa) and 
Kivu in the east.  
                                                       
5 Some crops have many types, such as highland and lowland maize germplasm, subdivided by maturity class. In such a 
case, the single “maize” crop surface is a composite in which each pixel would use the best variety most suitable for the location.  
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Figure 5. Potential crop production density in the DRC 
Panel A. The low-input scenario  Panel B. The high-input scenario 
 
Note: Potential crop production aggregated using individual crop prices (see Appendix Table B.4). 
    
9 
2.3. Estimating the Spatial Distribution of Crop Production in the DRC 
In order to evaluate food security, technology potential, and the environmental impacts of production in a 
strategic and regional context, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has been 
developing a spatial production allocation model (SPAM) for generating highly disaggregated, crop-
specific production data by the triangulation of any and all relevant background and partial information. 
Here we only briefly and informally describe the spatial allocation methodology. A more detailed 
description of the technique is presented in Appendix A, while still more complete descriptions of the 
data sources and the detailed model can be found in You et al. (2007) and You, Wood, and Wood-Sichra 
(2009). The spatial crop allocation problem is defined in a cross-entropy framework (You and Wood 
2006) in which all real-value parameters are first transformed into a corresponding probability form. The 
objective function of this spatial allocation model is the cross entropy of area shares and their prior, which 
are subject to a series of adding-up constraints for crop areas, land cover image, and crop suitability 
information; aggregation constraints between subnational units and irrigation potential; and a simple 
adding-up constraint for crop shares (Appendix A). The optimization model gives the allocated areas for 
each 5 x 5 minutes (about 9 x 9 km
2 on the equator). A postprocessing program would take the results 
from the model and calculate the harvest areas, yield, and production by pixels. The SPAM results also 
include the subcrop type maps split by production input levels (irrigated, high-input rainfed, low-input 
rainfed). 
Recently, IFPRI released its latest SPAM 2000 data product. These most recent SPAM results 
represent the last planned major update (Version 3.0) of the global (circa 2000) crop distribution model, 
which has undergone a significant validation and feedback process involving centers from the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and other collaborators. This release 
included the following 20 major crops in the world: wheat, rice, maize, barley, millet, sorghum, potato, 
sweet potato, cassava and yam, plantain and banana, soybean, dry bean, other pulse, sugarcane, sugar 
beet, coffee, cotton, other fiber, groundnut, and other oil crops. Together these 20 crops account for 
almost 90 percent of the world’s total harvested area. The current paper used an early version of SPAM 
Version 3. For the DRC, we included the latest (circa 2000) district-level area and production for the 
following crops: cassava, bean, paddy rice, plantain, sweet potato, millet, and potato.   
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Figure 6. Estimated crop production density in the DRC 
 
Using the crop distributions from the SPAM model, we first calculated crop production values by 
multiplying crop production and its corresponding prices. Then we aggregated all crop production values 
within this pixel to obtain the total production value per pixel. Figure 6 shows our final estimates of crop 
production values in the DRC. The overall pattern of crop production is not very different from the 
potential production estimates in Figure 5 (partly by construction), as high-production areas are again 
observed in the northwest (Equateur), in Bandundu in the west (near Kinshasa), and in southern Kasai. 
Production is notably estimated to be very low in Katanga in the southeast, and somewhat lower than 
expected in Kivu in the east, where civil war presumably reduced the agricultural production estimates for 
2000. 
2.4. Estimating Access to Markets 
Lack of access to both input and output markets has been identified as a significant constraint on 
agricultural development in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere (Ali and Pernia 2003; Minten and Kyle 
1999; Jacoby 2000; Van de Walle 2002; Gregory and Bumb 2006; Ahmed and Hossain 1990; Cicera and 
Arndt 2008; Dercon et al. 2008; Foster 2008). In our modeling exercises we estimated travel times to  
11 
major cities,
6 airports, and fluvial (river) and maritime ports. In each case, accessibility was estimated 
using the cost distance function from ESRI,
7
Modeling accessibility required the creation of a friction surface, which represents the time 
needed to cross each pixel. Speeds both on and off roads are affected by the friction surface, which is 
integrated by various input layers such as the transport network,
 which is defined as the time needed to travel from a specific 
pixel to the nearest location of interest.  
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 land cover (GLC2000 land cover), urban 
areas (GPW3-GRUMP), slope (derived from SRTM30 elevation), water bodies, international boundaries, 
and elevation (SRTM30 elevation). The first layer we consider is the elevation and slope, as these are 
factors that affect both on- and off-road speeds and hence the majority of other infrastructure layers. In 
effect, then, these factors are used as multiplying factors over the entire friction layer, as per Van 
Wagtendonk and Benedict (1980): 
ks e v v
− = 0   (2) 
where v = off-road foot-based velocity over the sloping terrain, v0 = the base speed of travel over flat 
terrain, s = the slope gradient (meters per meter), and k = a factor that defines the effect of slope on travel 
speed. 
For the DRC we assume a base speed of 5 kilometers per hour, with k set to 3.0 and constant for 
uphill and downhill travel. The velocities over the slope grid were computed and then converted into a 
friction factor by dividing the base speed by the slope speed. This was then used as a multiplier against 
the other friction components.  
When calculating the multiplier for elevation, we assume that elevations lower than 2,000 meters 
have no effect on travel speed. For elevations above 2,000 meters, the following speed factor is applied: 
                      (3)         
where f is the friction factor and E represents elevation in meters.
9
Finally, we consider travel times by transport type (e.g., by train or by car). Normally, the 
approach here assumes the transport types that are common across countries, such that highly detailed 
maps of transport routes (including road surfaces) suffice to give a good approximation of travel times on 
the ground (e.g., Nelson 2008; Dorosh et al. 2009). Hence, up-to-date maps are certainly highly 
important, and we have gone to considerable effort to update our information on road categories (176,000 
kilometers), rail networks (1,300 kilometers), and river networks (23,000 kilometers) in the DRC, as well 
as additional targets such as ports, maritime ports, and national and international airports (fluvial ports are 
particularly important for the DRC, as the Congo River and its branches are an important transport route 
for much of the population).  
 
However, it is still not clear that even these updated maps give a sufficiently accurate picture of 
the situation on the ground. As Minten and Kyle (1999; hereafter MK) note about the DRC: 
Most of the road network is in bad condition, with important sections almost 
impassable and access to some interior areas severely curtailed. Rural roads are 
maintained by local authorities who have neither the resources nor the 
organizational capacity to carry out the task.  
                                                       
6 Major cities include Kinshasa and cities with populations equal to or greater than 50,000, 100,000, and 200,000. 
7 For more details about the cost distance algorithm, refer to 
http://webhelp.esri.com/arcgisdesktop/9.2/index.cfm?TopicName=How%20Cost%20functions%20work (accessed February 21, 
2009). 
8 GIS data about road infrastructure, water bodies, hydrography, sea ports, and airports were obtained from 
http://rgc.cd/index.php (accessed May 28, 2009) 
9 To perform various market access scenarios and to speed up data processing, we used the Python geoprocessing scripting 
language to run geoprocessing operations and automate processes that include setting geoprocessing environments, reclassifying 
variables, extracting attributes, and performing advance spatial analyses. 
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In other words, a road might look normal from a satellite picture or transport map but in reality be 
“almost impassable.” To minimize this error—which could potentially bias our results—we use transport 
survey data collected by MK for the early 1990s to incorporate travel times into our market access 
estimates that more clearly reflect the realities on the ground in the DRC. Among other things, the MK 
survey asked agricultural traders in Kinshasa about where they imported food from and how long the 
journey took. For each journey MK also distinguished between travel times on paved and unpaved roads. 
From that data we can obviously derive travel speeds by road type. An additional and very context-
specific insight from the MK study is that the DRC’s lengthy and intense wet season increases travel 
times by as much as 40 percent.  
But although we consider the incorporation of MK’s survey data into our estimates a significant 
improvement over our generic “cross-country” estimates, we must still acknowledge that significant 
measurement errors undoubtedly remain, as well as the possibility that we still underestimate travel times 
in the DRC. First, the MK survey was conducted in the early 1990s, so its data are not very up-to-date. 
However, it is possible that this is not a major problem because economic stagnation and political turmoil 
have precluded any significant investments in infrastructure. If anything, roads are probably in worse 
condition now than they were in the 1990s, when they were already in terrible shape. A second problem is 
that the MK survey considered only travel times to Kinshasa, so most of its data yield information only on 
travel times in the west of the country. Given that the war in the east (North and South Kivu) may have 
led to especially rapid deterioration of the road network, it is possible that we underestimate travel times 
in these parts. Still, the use of territorial and provincial fixed effects should account for this in our 
econometric work, and all in all we consider the incorporation of the MK data a significant improvement 
upon the generic estimates of travel times in Africa and elsewhere.  
Table 3 shows assumed velocities by transport type for the dry and wet season, while Figure 7 
shows the transport network and the resulting estimates of market access in the DRC. Figure 6 shows the 
paltry length of the paved road network in the DRC, which is presently confined to the road linking 
Kinshasa to the coast, and a few patches in other parts of the country. In contrast, the navigable river 
network is vast and is historically linked to population settlements in the DRC, although reports indicate 
that some parts of the river have become less commonly used because of infrastructure problems and 
rising fuel costs (see our concluding section for further discussion). As for Figure 7, this suggests that the 
vast majority of land area in the country has very poor market access. Had we mapped travel times for the 
wet season, the map would suggest considerably longer travel times. 
Table 3. Assumed travel times by road category 
  Velocity (km/hr)  Incorporates 
information from 
MK’s survey? 
Transport type  Dry season  Wet season* 
Paved  80  46  Yes 
Four-wheel drive  30  17  Yes 
Loose gravel  25  14  Yes 
Trail  3  2   
Ferry crossing  5  3   
Rail/train  10  10   
Rivers  10  8  Yes 
Source:. Author’s calculations  
Notes: Speeds are partly based on existing assumptions (e.g., Nelson 2008), partly on anecdotal evidence for the DRC, and partly 
on Minten and Kyle’s (MK’s) survey-based estimates of differences in travel times between paved and unpaved roads and 
between dry and wet seasons. 
 *Wet season travel time differentials are also based on MK.  
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Figure 7. Estimates of travel times to 50,000-person towns 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
Note: See text for details. 
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3.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISOLATION AND POVERTY IN THE DRC 
In this section we try to establish what the relationship is between access to markets and general poverty 
reduction. Travel time, or isolation, has been established as a significant determinant of poverty reduction 
in a variety of studies, although estimates of the size of the impact do vary substantially. Kwon’s (2005) 
study on the poverty impact of roads in Indonesia finds that road investments improved the performance 
of provincial economic growth in poverty reduction such that every 1 percent growth in provincial GDP 
led to a decline in headcount poverty incidence by 0.33 percent in good-road provinces and 0.09 percent 
in bad-road provinces. Jalan and Ravallion (2002) find that for every 1 percent increase in kilometers of 
road per capita, household consumption rises by 0.08 percent in poor regions in China. Glewwe, 
Gragnolati, and Zaman (2000) conclude that rural communes in Vietnam with paved roads have a 67 
percent higher probability of escaping poverty than those without. And several studies in the volume 
edited by Fan (2008) find that rural roads have a very high impact on poverty reduction in places as 
diverse as China, India, and Uganda. Given the poor state of infrastructure in the DRC, we have a strong 
presumption that travel time is an important determinant of Congolese poverty, although we also need to 
bear in mind that other weaknesses in the economy could reduce the advantages of proximity to towns 
and markets (e.g., poor public service delivery). 
Ideally, we would like to establish the impact that agricultural development has on poverty 
reduction in the DRC, and the interactions between market access, agriculture, and poverty. However, 
neither of the two substantial household surveys available to us—the Demographic Health Survey (DHS) 
and the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS)—had agricultural components to them, so linking 
up agricultural production as a transmission mechanism for infrastructure’s effect on poverty in the DRC 
is not yet possible. Nevertheless, the DHS is useful in that it has what we believe to be a good proxy for 
travel time to sizable towns or cities, “travel time to the nearest health facility.” Moreover, although the 
DHS is not principally an economic survey, it does contain an asset-based poverty index that has been 
tested, validated, and strongly advocated by leading development economists (Filmer and Pritchett 2001; 
Sahn and Stifel 2003). This index is constructed via a principal components analysis of all the available 
consumer durable and asset variables in the DHS survey, all of which are listed in Table 4. 
Table 4. Asset variables used in the construction of the DRC’s DHS wealth index 
Source of drinking water  Share toilet with other households 
Type of toilet facility  Type of cooking fuel 
Has electricity  Has bed net for sleeping 
Has radio  Has mobile telephone 
Has television  Has grill/heater 
Has refrigerator  Has chair(s) 
Has bicycle  Has bed(s) 
Has motorcycle/scooter  Has lamp(s) 
Has car/truck  Has stove/cooker 
Main floor material  Has hoe(s) 
Main roof material  Has sewing machine 
Has telephone  Has canoe/dugout 
Source: Demographic Health Survey of the DRC (2007). 
Although we are confident that each of these measures provides a sufficiently accurate 
representation of the latent variables—isolation and poverty—there were some technical issues that 
required careful consideration. First, the asset-based poverty measure may be biased insofar as it could  
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underestimate poverty in urban areas simply because some basic assets are easier to obtain in urban areas. 
For example, 43 percent of households in Kinshasa—which is an exceptionally poor city by international 
standards—own a mobile phone, and Kinshasa is the only province in the DRC with substantial 
electricity supply. Since Kinshasa in particular was a major concern in this regard and in several other 
regards, we chose to run our wealth regressions separately for each province.  
A second issue relates to market access proxy. Health facilities in the DRC are almost solely 
available in major towns, so it is quite likely that “travel time to the nearest health facility” is a good 
proxy for travel time to the nearest major town. Still, we must acknowledge potential biases and general 
measurement error. In terms of biases, it is possible that health facilities are not only urban biased (which 
is what we assume anyway) but also biased to capital cities or mining towns, and so on. Arguably a more 
important bias is that access to a health facility influences poverty not through infrastructure or market 
access per se but through the health facilities themselves. Likewise, access to a city may improve access 
to education, which in turn affects poverty. In order to more closely capture the effects of access to 
markets, we therefore run regressions that control for education and health outcomes, as well as other 
household characteristics such as age and marital status. When education and health are included in the 
regressions we call this the “market proximity effect,” and when education and health are excluded we 
call this the “total proximity effect.” 
The full regression results are not reported because running separate regressions for each 
province results in a large number of results. In Figure 8 and Table 5 we therefore concentrate on the 
effects of isolation, noting only that the regressions generally seemed to perform well, explaining 20–50 
percent of the variation in wealth outcomes across households in a given province. Figure 8 shows the 
relationship between travel time to health facilities and asset-based poverty within each province. 
Specifically, we look at the poorest (fifth) quintile, the second quintile (“richer”), and the first quintile 
(“richest”). Figure 8 demonstrates that with the exception of Kinshasa and neighboring Bandundu 
Province, the difference in travel times between the poorest and richest Congolese is substantial. In 
virtually all provinces, an average person in the poorest quintile must travel at least twice as long to reach 
a health facility as the richest. On this basis, “travel time” looks like a potentially powerful determinant of 
wealth. 
Figure 8. The relationship between travel time to health facilities and asset-based poverty 
 









































In Table 5 we report results from more rigorous tests of the impact of isolation on wealth. One 
issue here is that isolation could impact wealth through a variety of channels, such as access to health 
goods and services, education, and nonfarm employment, as well as access to other markets, such as 
agricultural input and output markets. When we run regressions that exclude these variables, we call this 
elasticity the “total effect.” When we run regressions that control for health, education, and agricultural 
employment outcomes, we call this the “market effect” because the controls presumably net out the other 
channels through which access to cities affects household wealth. We also think of the difference between 
both estimates as a rough measure of how important access to agricultural output markets is for household 
wealth accumulation. Finally, because we are interested in the agricultural population specifically, we 
also repeat these two specifications for agricultural populations only (clearly, agricultural employment is 
dropped as a control here). Note, also, that since we are interested in agriculture we drop Kinshasa 
Province, as it is almost entirely urban. 
Table 5 shows that the elasticity between travel time and wealth in the total population varies 
substantially across provinces—from -0.06 to around -0.40—although the elasticities are significant in all 
provinces. When we add controls for education, health, and agricultural employment outcomes (Column 
2), these market effect elasticities are lower than the total effect in all cases except Kasai Oriental, where 
the elasticity is about the same. Also, in the two northern provinces of Orientale and Equateur we find that 
the market effect is zero, suggesting that isolation is not an important determinant of wealth there once 
education, health, and employment controls are included. These two northern provinces excluded, 
Column 3 shows that the market effect share of the total effect (Column 2 divided by Column 1) varies 
from around 50 to 100 percent. Turning next to the agricultural population only—as defined by 
agriculture being the primary employment of the adult in question—we generally find very similar 
results. As for why the two northern provinces should not show any market effects, there could be several 
factors. First, broader market access is very low because there are relatively few major towns and very 
limited access to Kinshasa. Indeed, river access is the only viable means for any agricultural produce to 
reach Kinshasa. This largely limits trade to nonperishable goods, and there are also reports that some of 
the northern river routes are largely unused because of silting and dilapidated port infrastructure. 
Of course, the approach adopted to separate total effects from agricultural market effects in Table 
5 is fairly crude, and any conclusions we draw from this must certainly be qualified.
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 Also, some (but not 
all) of the elasticities are rather low. This could due to a number of factors, such as our use of a proxy for 
market access rather than a more targeted measure (i.e., attenuation bias). Another reason could be the 
limited purchasing power in urban areas that results from a very depressed economy, and the general 
unavailability of modern agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers and improved seeds. Nevertheless, Table 5 
at least provides some indirect evidence that access to markets could be a very important determinant of 
wealth accumulation in the DRC, and that isolation constrains wealth accumulation for agricultural 
workers in particular. In the next section we look to test more specific links between agricultural 
production and market access. 
                                                       
10 For one thing, each elasticity is a stochastic point estimate, and we have not tested for differences in elasticities across 
regressions. Second, it is likely that the estimates of agricultural market effects represent upper bounds, because our ability to 
control for education and health effects is only as good as the control variables we use, which are doubtless imperfect. Moreover, 
because our welfare measure is based on specific assets, it may simply be that proximity to towns determines the costs and 
benefits of purchasing these assets (and repairing them, etc.).  
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Table 5. Estimated elasticities of travel time and wealth across provinces 
  Total population  Agricultural population 




No  Yes    No  Yes   











share = 5/6 
Bandundu  -0.09  -0.05  60%  -0.04  -0.03*  67% 
Bas-Congo  -0.13  -0.12  87%  -0.21  -0.12  57% 
Equateur  -0.06  0.01*  0%  -0.11  0.00*  0% 
Kasai occidental  -0.09  -0.05  61%  -0.13  -0.04  28% 
Kasai oriental  -0.09  -0.11  100%  -0.15  -0.09  63% 
Katanga  -0.37  -0.35  94%  -0.42  -0.23  55% 
Maniema  -0.08  -0.05  57%  -0.07  -0.05  77% 
Nord-Kivu  -0.25  -0.22  90%  -0.28  -0.21  74% 
Orientale  -0.09  -0.01*  0%  -0.13  0.00*  0% 
Sud-Kivu  -0.25  -0.11  45%  -0.29  -0.14  47% 
Average  -0.15  -0.11  61%  -0.18  -0.09  47% 
Average, excluding the 
north 
-17%  -13%  74%  -20%  -13%  59% 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Notes: * indicates insignificant coefficient at 10% level. “The north” refers to Orientale and Equateur provinces. 
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4.  MARKET ACCESS AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION:  
WHAT ARE THE LINKS IN THE DRC? 
4.1. Conceptual Framework and Model 
In assessing the implications of location and transport investments for crop production and productivity in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, we follow Dorosh et al. (2009) in adopting a conceptual framework in which 
transport investments affect both the supply of and demand for crop production. On the supply side, the 
production of crop j under production system l in location (pixel) i depends on the agronomic potential pj, 
under the production system l in location i, and unobserved location-specific variables (Ωi) such as output 
and factor prices, and available technology. Demand for a crop produced in location i depends on the size 
of the local market surrounding location i, which is in turn determined by the population, distribution of 
per capita incomes, and trade regime (especially whether the domestic market is integrated with the 
international market).  
The hypothesis to be tested is that better transport connectivity increases crop production (or 
productivity) after controlling for other factors. The effects of better transportation are assumed to take 
place through a reduction in the transport costs of goods and services, which raises the producer prices of 
crops, as we saw in Section 1. Reduced transport costs also lower the costs and profitability of supplying 
modern inputs such as fertilizers, seeds, extension services, and other technologies (Ahmed and Hossain 
1990). However, because the DRC’s agricultural economy currently uses scarcely any of these modern 
inputs, we suspect that any positive association between market access and agricultural production 
primarily reflects the impacts of access to output markets for agricultural produce, rather than input 
markets. Were government policies to simultaneously invest in infrastructure and the adoption of modern 
inputs, it is probable that the impacts of infrastructure investments would be higher in the long run, 
although there are many factors in addition to transport costs that explain why African farmers do not 
adopt modern technologies. 
Another way in which greater market access influences agricultural production is by affecting the 
composition of agricultural production. As lower transport costs result in a greater percentage reduction in 
the price of perishable and bulky items such as vegetables, the profitability of these items increases 
relative to nonperishable crops (the von Thunen hypothesis). Indeed, Minten and Kyle (1999) found that 
this von Thunen effect was very important in the DRC: 
The more perishable and the higher value the products, such as fruits, vegetables, cassava 
roots, cassava chikwangue, cassava leaves, tomatoes, pimento, the less distance they are 
transported. The basic less perishable staples (cassava chips, peanuts, maize) come from 
further away. The average distance they are transported is 337, 373, and 323 km, 
respectively. Compared to vegetables, 107 km, they come from three times as far. The von 
Thunen effect is also illustrated by the smaller standard deviation in distance traveled for the 
individual products compared to the standard deviation of the average. Only cassava chips 
and maize are characterized by a higher standard deviation indicating their omnipresence as 
a cash crop. 
Finally, where the transport cost reduction is large enough and widespread enough, there are 
potential general equilibrium effects on rural and urban nonfarm sectors, on wages and overall incomes, 
and on “noneconomic” factors such as political stability and law enforcement. For example, increased 
agricultural trade boosts demand for transport services in the urban and rural nonfarm economy. 
However, our model does not capture these spillover effects because we focus only on explaining 
agricultural production.  
Turning more specifically to the impacts of market access on crop production, we closely follow 
the basic model used by Dorosh et al. (2009), which is a reduced-form crop production function: 
  Crop productionijl = f(agronomic potentialijl, local market sizei, market accessi, Ω).  (4)  
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Although the measurement of these variables is discussed above, the theoretical rationale for the 
model is that these variables capture both supply-side factors, such as agronomic potential and access to 
input markets (although these are not yet important in the DRC), and demand-side factors relating to 
access to local markets as well as major towns or cities. With regard to the latter, we consider a 50,000-
person town a sufficiently sizable market, although we experiment with urban agglomerations of other 
sizes as well.  
4.2. Econometric Issues 
Several econometric issues arise with such a model. First, it is necessary to correct for the bias in the 
regression estimates arising because the dependent variable (crop production/productivity) is left-
censored data (i.e., by definition, their values are never less than a certain value, in this case, zero). To 
overcome this potential bias, we estimate the equations using a Tobit (censored regression) model and 
drop areas (pixels) that are unsuitable for agricultural production from our regression.  
A second broad issue is endogeneity. There are potentially three sources of endogeneity in the 
methodology outlined above. First, since the dependent variable is a constructed variable, we may have 
induced endogeneity by construction. Essentially, our approach to generating spatially disaggregated data 
involves taking the lowest possible subnational data (in the DRC this is at the territorial level) and then 
plausibly “spreading out” this data across even more disaggregated spatial units (the pixel level) using 
other spatially disaggregated variables such as land area, rainfall, soil quality, and population. It follows 
that omitting these variables from our regression could create a serious endogeneity problem because they 
may affect both agricultural production and market access. We therefore include these variables in all our 
regressions and experiment with nonlinear specifications as well.  
Second, road placement could be endogenous because roads are not randomly allocated across a 
country. Decisions on where to build roads could be affected by the existing population distribution, 
geographical factors (e.g., the roughness of the terrain, access to waterways, climate), economic factors 
(e.g., mineral deposits, land productivity), or political factors (e.g., clientelism, differences in governance 
quality). Hence, while we may think we are estimating the impacts of market access on productivity, 
other factors that are correlated with market access could, in fact, be driving the association between 
market access and agricultural production (generally, we would expect the market access coefficient to be 
biased upward), leading to spurious regression. However, since we include both province-level and 
territory-level fixed effects, we argue that our model should adequately control for these factors, assuming 
they are indeed fixed effects. We also reiterate that our model controls for agricultural potential and 
population, in case roads are intentionally built to access high-potential or high-population areas. Fixed 
effects should also control for other factors that are not, strictly speaking, fixed effects, such as conflict in 
the Kivu region from 1998 onward. 
Third, people placement could be endogenous. For example, it is possible that more 
entrepreneurial farmers might migrate to areas that have better access to roads or larger markets, or to 
cities. Or refugees from conflict zones might migrate to more isolated areas where land availability is 
greater (Jacoby and Minten 2009). In the first case, the coefficient on our market access measures could 
again be biased upward because we would be partially capturing the effects of entrepreneurship rather 
than pure market access effects. In the refugee case it seems likely that the coefficient could be biased 
downward.  
Without household data it is not possible to purge the market access variable of entrepreneurship 
or refugee effects, or to know whether there are significant differences between migrant and nonmigrant 
households in terms of production factors, human capital, farming experience, and so on. However, there 
are good grounds to think that this bias is probably very small. For one thing, the available evidence 
suggests that, as a proportion of the total population, migration flows in the DRC have been relatively 
small. For example, UN data suggest that the total population that migrated out of the DRC from 1950 to 
2000 was just over a million. Relative to the DRC’s population, that figure is very small. As for internal 
migration, anecdotal evidence suggests that is also relatively small scale. Rural-to-rural migration is  
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significantly constrained by ethnic and linguistic differences, and generally unnecessary given the 
abundance of adequate land in the DRC. This mostly leaves rural-to-urban migration, which has been 
more significant. Although we do not have data on the extent of rural-to-urban migration, we can infer 
some broad magnitudes from UN data on city sizes in the DRC. Like cities in other African countries, 
DRC cities have grown quickly from very small bases, but this is partly because of very high fertility 
rates. Overall, the estimated share of the population that is urban has increased from 19 percent in 1950 to 
just over 30 percent in 2005. Moreover, these high population growth rates have led many rural towns in 
the DRC to grow into “urban agglomerations.” In other words, the vast majority of Congolese still live 
where their grandparents lived. Hence, we believe self-selection issues related to migration are a very 
small bias in the current exercise, although they may have some impact in influencing results for Kivu 
and other conflict-affected regions.
11
Another issue related to estimation biases is the use of a cross-section to make projections about 
the likely impacts of current infrastructure policies. The use of a cross-section essentially implies that we 
are inferring the long-run benefits of additional infrastructure. In practice, we don’t know how long the 
long run is. For example, suppose that a benefit of being closer to a city is greater access to fertilizers and 
improved seeds. If farmers lack knowledge of fertilizers and new seeds, their learning process may be 
quite slow. This example also illustrates that the impacts of new roads are likely to be highly conditional 
on other policies and outcomes. For example, Ruijsav, Schweigman, and Lutz (2004) demonstrate that the 
returns to road investments in Burkina Faso are highly conditional upon raising farm productivity and 
reducing other transaction costs. Urban income growth will also affect demand for agricultural produce. 
Ruijsav Schweigman, and Lutz also demonstrate that improving only some key roads can have 
unintended negative consequences for farmers and traders not connected to the new roads because their 
own goods and services suddenly become less competitive. However, new roads can create new and 
unexpected opportunities for trade that are not captured in short-run estimates of the returns to roads. 
Simulation studies have shown that improving roads could lead to more rapid migration, with potentially 
ambiguous effects on agricultural production and rural and urban welfare (Dorosh and Thurlow 2009). 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to investigate these rather nuanced effects in our relatively simple 
econometric approach. Nevertheless, these caveats should be borne in mind, especially when considering 
the likely impacts of the road investments recently proposed in the DRC. 
 
4.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics aimed at demonstrating some basic results for the key variables of 
interest. Pixel sizes are roughly 1 square kilometer, so the total sample for the regressions is very large—
roughly 25,000—although we use only about 15,000 pixels in the regressions because many pixels do not 
have crop production values.  
Table 7 shows the correlation matrix between the explanatory variables. Initially we were 
interested in testing a range of market access variables, but mutlicollinearity proved to be serious 
problem. However, the two most important market access variables for agricultural production in the 
DRC are access to cities and access to fluvial ports. Minten and Kyle (1999), for example, find that about 
two-thirds of agricultural trade from the hinterland to Kinshasa is by road, and the other third by river. 
Moreover, as we saw in the previous section, nearly all the DRC’s towns with 50,000-plus populations 
are located on navigable rivers. The good news is that travel time to a town with 50,000-plus population 
and travel time to a fluvial port are not so highly correlated that multicollinearity becomes overly serious 
(r = 0.61). The only other variable that is highly correlated with travel time to a city (50,000 or 100,000) 
is the population of the pixel (r = -0.46), indicating that population density decreases with isolation from 
cities, as expected. 
                                                       
11 Another issue is whether it is only entrepreneurial people who migrate. Relative to other countries, it is possible that more 
migration in the DRC is due to conflict, hence reducing the bias due to entrepreneurial migration.  
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Table 8 looks at these relationships in greater detail by breaking up travel time to a 50,000-person 
city by deciles (Column 1). Column 2 shows the average travel time in the dry season for each decile. 
What is most astonishing is the absolute length of travel times. Even the second and third deciles involve 
travel times of well over five hours (a common benchmark for proximity), while the lower five deciles 
involve travel times from half a day to an extreme 1.5 days to reach a 50,000-person town. Column 3 also 
shows that these are not small populations living in isolation.  
The bottom five quintiles contain about 25 percent of the total population and involve travel times 
of half a day or more to 50,000-person towns. As for agricultural production (Columns 4 and 5), most of 
this takes place in the less isolated regions. About 62 percent of production value takes place in the first 
four travel-time quintiles. Finally, Column 6 shows production as a percentage of potential production 
(based on the crop suitability measure described above). This ratio is very low (5 percent or less) for all 
degrees of isolation, but it also declines almost monotonically with isolation, suggesting that lack of 
market access is a significant constraint on the fuller utilization of the DRC’s agricultural potential. Based 
on these basic descriptive statistics, we do expect a reasonably strong correlation between market access 
and agricultural production. 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
# of 
observations  Mean  Standard error  Minimum  Maximum 
Accessibility (minutes) 
  50K cities  24,955  1,008.9  632.4  0  4,397 
  100K cities  24,955  1,093.1  652.1  0  4,400 
  Fluvial port  24,955  1,081.9  646.1  0  4,165 
Population  24,955  2,273.8  16,697.0  0  1,234,168 
Agricultural potential (US$1,000,000) 
  Low inputs  24,955  15.0  15.6  0  99 
  Intermediate inputs  24,955  155.0  178.0  0  1,080 
  High inputs  24,955  267.0  168.0  0  720 
Estimated agricultural production (US$1,000) 
  Low inputs  24,955  57.2  160.9  0  3,068.392 
  Intermediate inputs  24,955  0.1  0.2  0  7.251575 
  High inputs  24,955  7.0  21.6  0  1,960.588 
Source : Authors’ calculations 
Table 7. Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
   Travel time – 
50K city 
Travel time – 
100K city 





Travel time – 
50K city 
1.00             
Travel time – 
100K city 
0.93  1.00          
Travel time – 
fluvial port 
0.61  0.54  1.00       
Potential 
production 
-0.01  0.01  0.11  1.00    
Population  -0.46  -0.46  -0.25  -0.07  1.00 
Source: Authors’ calculations  
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Table 8. Travel time, population, and crop production in the DRC 
1. Travel time 
decile 
2. Travel time 
(African average) 






6. Production  
(% potential) 
1  3.3  41.4  444.6  19.5  5.4 
2  6.7  14.0  401.9  17.7  1.7 
3  9.1  9.9  322.5  14.2  2.7 
4  11.4  7.1  249.4  11.0  0.3 
5  13.7  6.5  179.0  7.9  1.7 
6  16.2  5.6  186.8  8.2  0.4 
7  18.9  4.7  155.7  6.8  0.2 
8  22.3  4.3  130.8  5.7  0.3 
9  27.0  3.4  118.3  5.2  0.1 
10  39.5  2.9  87.7  3.9  0.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Compared to average crop yields in Africa, the DRC is still lagging behind despite its favorable 
agroclimatic conditions. For example, in 2006, DRC farmers produced 7.9 tons per hectare of cassava on 
average, compared to 9.9 tons per hectare in Africa. Of all 149 territories, only 6 (Oshwe, Mwene-Ditu, 
Kiri, Kamiji, Kabinda, and Inongo) produce above the African average. The yield for rice in Africa (2.3 
tons per hectare) is 2.9 times higher than in the DRC (0.78 ton per hectare). The average maize yield (0.8 
ton per hectare) is still very low compared to the African average (1.7 tons per hectare).  
Using  a typology of Congolese territories with respect to the value of agricultural production and 
travel time to cities of at least 50,000 people, we define four groups of territories: Zone I: low production 
and high accessibility; Zone II: high production and high accessibility; Zone III: high production and low 
accessibility; and Zone IV: low production and high accessibility. In terms of road investment priorities, 
territories in Zone III should be considered as a prime target. Similar conclusions can be drawn with 
respect to production potential, where 32 territories are above production potential average but below 
accessibility average.  
Table 9 looks to test this hypothesis in a multivariate setting by estimating the supply-and-
demand crop production outlined in equation (4) in Section 4. For all regressions we use the Tobit 
regressor to address the censoring of values. Because both dependent and independent variables are in 
logs, the censoring is not especially important, but it still accounts for missing values generated by zero 
production across pixels. Also, all regressions include territorial fixed effects. These territories are the 
smallest subnational units and number about 150 (some drop out because of limited observations). We 
also experimented with district fixed effects (of which there are about 30) and provincial fixed effects 
(about 15). These made no substantial differences to the results, although we tended to find that parameter 
heterogeneity was more of an issue with these more aggregated fixed effects. In other words, interactions 
between travel time and crop potential and travel time and population became significant when we 
stopped using the more disaggregated territorial effects. Those results are not reported here but are 
available upon request. 
Turning to the results in Table 9, we first specified a simple log-linear that is quite similar to the 
models specified by Dorosh et al. (2009), with the only difference being that we include only pixel 
population rather than neighboring populations. This was because mutlicollinearity between the pixel 
population and the local (squared 100 kilometer) population was very high in our sample, so much so that 
it prevented us from specifying both variables (however, in other results reported below we address this 
issue through other means). Regression 1 indicates that the elasticity between travel time to a city with 
50,000-plus population and agricultural production is highly significant and equal to about -0.44,  
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indicating that a 1 percent reduction in travel time would increase agricultural production by almost 0.5 
percent. This is reasonably large, although the elasticity is still much lower than the analogous elasticities 
reported by Dorosh et al. for all of Sub-Saharan Africa and subregions. The elasticity for agricultural 
potential is also quite low (0.18), although this is not surprising in a country where agricultural production 
is highly depressed.  
In Regression 2 we depart from Dorosh et al. (2009) by specifying a quadratic term for pixel 
population, which is highly significant, indicating that the effect of population size on production was 
generally negative but that the impact declined as population size increased. However, it is somewhat 
difficult to know what impact this is picking up. Population size could reflect local market access, but it 
also picks up the size of the labor force (which ought to make the coefficient positive), or available land 
per capita (average farm size). It could also be that the coefficient is negative because highly dense areas 
are largely nonagricultural. For these reasons we do not focus much attention on the population term. 
In Regression 3 we add a new variable: travel time to fluvial ports. As we saw in Section 2, 
fluvial ports are extremely important in the DRC because the population has historically agglomerated on 
these rivers for the benefits that accrue in terms of trade, transport, and water supply. It turns out that the 
decision to consider fluvial ports in this study was very important. In fact, adding this target significantly 
reduces the elasticity on market access to towns with 50,000-plus populations—from around -0.43 in 
Regressions 1 and 2 to just -0.16 in Regression 3. In contrast, the elasticity between travel time to fluvial 
ports and crop production is around 0.37. In Regression 4 we drop travel time to cities with 50,000-plus 
populations to see whether fluvial port access might simply be picking up the effect of 50,000-plus towns. 
However, the coefficient on fluvial ports is substantially larger in Regression 4 than the coefficients in 
Regressions 1 and 2, so it appears that access to fluvial ports has a genuinely large effect on production. 
This is not surprising insofar as connecting a farmer to one river port obviously connects him or her to 
other river ports. Moreover, every river port in the DRC directly connects to the country’s largest city 
(Kinshasa) and the country’s only international (maritime) port (Boma). In terms of sheer physical access 
to population centers, then, the river network has great potential. We therefore take up the question of the 
river network’s trade potential in our concluding section. Finally, Regressions 5 to 7 replicate Regressions 
1 to 3, with travel time to towns with 100,000-plus populations replacing travel time to towns with 
50,000-plus populations. However, the results are materially the same, with just some slight reductions in 
elasticities. 
Finally, Table 10 compares our results to those of Dorosh et al. (2009), in which the authors run 
similar agricultural production regressions for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole as well as West Africa, the 
region that is most similar to the DRC in terms of agroclimatic factors and crop mix. The first three 
columns also report results from alternative aggregations of fixed effects. In the DRC sample, we do not 
find that using alternative aggregations of fixed effects makes any substantive difference to the results. 
However, the main finding in Table 10 is that the elasticities for market access and crop potential are 
much smaller in our DRC sample than they were in the full African or West African samples used by 
Dorosh et al. One concern is that the Dorosh et al. study uses very limited country effects, which could 
conceivably lead to some upward bias in the results (for example, if fixed effects simultaneously account 
for both greater market access and greater production levels), but we have no way of confirming this, and 
we should also note that the disparities could well be real. Indeed, one problem we face in this study is 
that every element of the DRC economy—the infrastructure and agriculture sectors in particular—is so 
depressed that the elasticities in Tables 9 arguably do not reveal the true potential of agriculture in the 
DRC (see our concluding section for more discussion of this issue).  
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Table 9. Estimating the impacts of road connectivity on crop production (log) 
Regression No.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Estimation method  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit 
               
Ln(travel time to 50K city)  -0.44***  -0.43***  -0.16***         
               
Ln(travel time fluvial port)      -0.37***  -0.51***      -0.43*** 
               
Ln(travel time to 100K city)          -0.43***  -0.41***  -0.10** 
               
Ln(potential production, low inputs)  0.18***  0.18**  0.18***  0.18***  0.18***  0.18***  0.18*** 
               
Ln(population)  -0.05**  -0.43***  -0.45***  -0.50***  -0.05*  -0.43***  -0.46*** 
               
Ln(population), squared    0.027***  0.027***  0.033***    0.027***  0.030*** 
               
Total observations  15,122  15122  15122  15125  15125  15125  15125 
Pseudo R-squared  0.084  0.084  0.085  0.085  0.083  0.083  0.085 
Territorial fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
               
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 10. Comparing across alternative fixed effects and samples 
 Source of 
elasticities >> 
DRC   DRC  
 
DRC   Dorosh –  
All Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Dorosh –  
West Africa 
Fixed effects  Territories  Districts  Provinces  Countries  Countries 
No. of fixed effects  150  30  15  42  5 
Total observations  15,525  15,525  15,525  125,982  15,500 
Ratio (%) of fixed 
effects to no. of 
observations  
0.97  0.19  0.10  0.03  0.03 
Elasticities           
Travel time to 
100K-plus city 
-0.43***  -0.46***  -0.41***  -2.864***  -1.102*** 
Crop potential  0.18***  0.22***  0.20***  0.247***  0.406*** 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Finally, in addition to the robustness tests involving fixed effects, we also engaged in one other 
potentially important robustness test. Instead of specifying total crop production as the dependent 
variable, we specified total production per capita. Although the pixel populations are no doubt measured 
with considerable error (there has not been a census in the DRC since the 1980s), production per capita is 
a variable that ought to have a closer connection to rural welfare (i.e., incomes, food security) than total 
production, which is more important from a trade perspective. The results are reported in Appendix Table 
B.1. The per capita production regressions in Appendix Table B.1 also include a new explanatory 
variable—local population density—which is used as a proxy for local market access in the Dorosh et al. 
(2009) study. However, as in the Dorosh et al. results for low-input African agriculture, we find that the 
elasticity of this variable is negative. We suspect that this is because higher local population densities may 
be capturing smaller farm sizes and the greater prevalence of nonfarm activities. Again, we can attach 
only very limited importance to these results. The more important finding from the robustness tests in 
Appendix Table B.1 is that the per capita elasticities for market access and crop potential are very similar 
to those reported in Table 9.  
26 
5.  SIMULATING THE IMPACTS OF PROPOSED ROAD INVESTMENTS IN THE DRC 
In the introduction we noted that the World Bank and the British government have signed a five-year 
agreement for the rehabilitation and upgrading of 1,800 kilometers of high-priority roads, while China 
and the DRC government are planning to rehabilitee some 5,800 kilometers of roads and an equally long 
railway network. Since one of the motivations for this paper is to provide an agricultural perspective on 
forthcoming infrastructure investments, this section presents estimates of the impact of alternative road 
investment plans on market access and agricultural production. To do so, we calculate market access with 
respect to three scenarios:  
1.  The “government’s plan”: pavement of 8,500 kilometers of roads and the construction and 
improvement of railways. This includes the government’s major road programs with funding 
and assistance from the World Bank, the British government, and the Chinese government. 
The upgraded road areas are listed in Appendix Table B.2. 
2.  Our own “network plan”: pavement of 10,193 kilometers of national roads, resulting in a 
more ambitious road network that creates a contiguous pan-DRC network linking the four 
corners of the country.  
3.  A “comprehensive plan”: pavement of 10,193 kilometers of national roads to create a 
contiguous pan-DRC road network, plus the upgrading of 26,000 kilometers of feeder roads, 
which (by assumption) involves changing the average speed from 30 kilometers per hour to 
50 kilometers per hour. This is a very ambitious plan involving greater integration of the rural 
community.  
Table 11. Scenarios by road category 
  Transport category (km)
  Estimated 






















Current network  1,611   26,500  59,500  87,200  239  1,486  n.a. 
Future scenarios               
“Government’s”   8,500   25,875  53,236  87,200  239  3,200  US$2,064 
“Network”   10,193   26,074  51,344  87,200  239  3,200  US$3,053 
“Comprehensive
”  
10,193   26,074  
(80 km/hr) 
51,344  87,200  239  3,200  US$3,461 
Source: Authors’ simulation assumptions. 
Notes: The government’s plan is based on World Bank, U.K. Department for International Development (DFID), and Chinese 
government documents. Please contact the authors for further details. The estimated cost of each plan is based on Africon (2008). 
See text for details. 
Table 11 describes each scenario by road category, while Figures 9 to 12 present the geographical 
distribution of roads included in each scenario. The last column of Table 12 also estimates the costs of 
each project based on a recent study conducted by Africon (2008) for the Africa Infrastructure Country 
Diagnostic (AICD). The paper assessed the unit costs of road construction for 115 road projects in Africa 
(mostly funded by a single donor), including 25 contracts to build new paved roads, 45 to rehabilitate 
paved roads, 8 to maintain paved roads, and 37 to regravel unpaved roads. To estimate the costs of each 
of the scenarios in Table 12 we used the median cost of rehabilitating paved roads (US$299,551 per lane 
kilometer) to speeds greater than 50 kilometers per hour, and the median unit cost of regraveling roads 
(US$15,625 per lane kilometer). Although the derived figures are consistent with the sums of money 
being proposed by the World Bank, DFID, and China, the estimates are only ballpark figures, so the real 
costs could be substantially higher or lower. They could be lower because (1) the Africon report found  
27 
that the lower quartile unit costs for paved roads rehabilitated were just two-thirds that of the median level 
(US$194,679); (2) the median values were significantly higher than unit costs reported by the World 
Bank (one of the donors in the DRC); and (3) unit costs tended to be lower for larger projects (which the 
DRC’s certainly is), presumably because of economies of scale. However, the report also found that unit 
costs of road infrastructure projects in Africa have been rising in recent years due to rising costs of 
materials and fuel, sometimes by as much as 30–50 percent. Moreover, it seems reasonable to expect that 
the DRC’s difficult terrain and climatic conditions could mean that road construction there is more 
expensive than normal. 
Simulation results suggest that the government roads program will reduce travel time to fluvial 
ports and nearest cities with at least 50,000 people by 10.7 and 10.9 percent, respectively (Table 12). 
Interestingly, however, there is a great deal of variation by province and by whether fluvial ports or 
general town access is considered. For fluvial ports, two provinces are expected to see travel times 
reduced by around 20 percent: Nord Kivu and Province Orientale. This is consistent with the fact that a 
number of fluvial ports are located in Province Orientale. But for access to towns with populations of 
50,000, the dispersion across provinces is more limited. As for the network plan, we surprisingly find that 
its impacts seem to be similar to those of the government plan, reducing travel time to ports by 11.0 
percent but only reducing travel times to cities by 10.1 percent. More interesting are the effects of the 
comprehensive plan, which includes an upgrading of rural feeder roads. Upgrading these feeder roads 
almost doubles the reduction in travel times.  
Figure 9. Current paved roads   Figure 10. Government upgrade program 
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Figure 11. Pan-DRC network plan  Figure 12. Comprehensive plan with rural feeder 
roads 
 
Source: Maps derived by the authors. 
Table 12. Impact of road investments on travel times by scenario (% change) 
  Fluvial ports  Nearest 50,000-person cities 
Province  Government  Network 
Comprehensiv
e  Government  Network 
Comprehensiv
e 
Bandundu  -8.1  -5.4  -17.8  -7.8  -5.0  -18.0 
Bas-Congo  -13.5  -0.7  -8.0  -18.1  -0.8  -11.2 
Equateur  -5.8  -4.1  -10.4  -11.8  -8.2  -16.0 
Kasai-
Occidental  -5.1  -6.8  -15.8  -7.6  -10.8  -19.6 
Kasai-Oriental  -1.9  -13.7  -21.6  -6.1  -19.1  -25.2 
Katanga  -12.5  -13.8  -22.0  -8.0  -8.7  -17.6 
Kinshasa  -7.5  -4.9  -5.5  -7.7  -5.1  -5.7 
Maniema  -2.1  -1.3  -13.0  -8.7  -7.4  -15.3 
Nod-Kivu  -22.4  -17.2  -19.9  -12.2  -9.7  -14.3 
Province 
Orientale  -21.0  -21.5  -26.0  -14.4  -12.8  -19.3 
Sud-Kivu  -9.7  -11.4  -21.9  -18.0  -18.7  -23.7 
Total  -10.7  -11.0  -18.4  -10.9  -10.2  -18.1 
Source: Authors’ simulation results. 
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Table 13 shows the estimated impacts on agricultural production. The first finding is that, 
regardless of scenarios, the provinces of Province Orientale, Equateur, Kasai-Oriental, and Bandundu 
capture more than 68 percent of the additional value of agricultural production induced by road 
investments. Second, the government and network plans are both estimated to boost agricultural 
production by around US$11 million, while the comprehensive plan would increase production by 
US$16.6 million, an increase of around 50 percent. This 50 percent increase in production is quite high 
relative to the extra costs of the feeder roads (just 13 percent). However, the agricultural returns to 
building roads are fairly small relative to the cost of building the roads, precisely because the estimated 
elasticities between travel time and production are relatively low in the DRC. Even excluding the costs of 
road maintenance, 10 years of increased agricultural production would result in US$0.11 billion of extra 
agricultural production, whereas the costs of the roads would be almost US$2.1 billion. We note, 
however, that were we to use the estimated elasticities derived by Dorosh et al. (2009), a simple back-of-
the-envelope calculation would suggest that the extra agricultural production would add up to around 
US$0.6 billion (if the Africa-wide elasticity of 2.86 is used) or US$0.23 billion (if the West African 
elasticity of 1.10 is used).  
Table 13. Impact of road investments on agricultural production by scenario (US$ thousands) 
 Province  Government  Network 
Comprehensiv
e 
Bandundu  1.9  1.7  2.8 
Bas-Congo  0.5  0.0  0.5 
Equateur  1.7  1.4  2.3 
Kasai-Occidental  0.5  0.7  1.4 
Kasai-Oriental  0.3  1.3  1.9 
Katanga  0.7  0.7  1.2 
Kinshasa  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Maniema  0.1  0.1  0.5 
Nod-Kivu  0.8  0.6  0.7 
Province 
Orientale  3.7  3.6  4.3 
Sud-Kivu  0.6  0.7  0.9 
Total  11.0  10.8  16.6 
Source: Authors’ simulation results. 
Notes: Estimates derived by recalculating travel times in the DRC using the elasticities from Regression 3 in Table 9. 
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6.  DISCUSSION 
The question of how best to translate the DRC’s enormous agricultural potential into an engine of 
economic growth and poverty reduction is a vitally important one, but a question still significantly 
underresearched. This paper has argued that infrastructure is probably the most binding constraint on 
what is a highly dispersed and predominantly agrarian economy; however, our principal goal was to 
address not the very general question of whether infrastructure is important for the DRC, but how 
important infrastructure is for agricultural production and poverty reduction. As it turns out, our results 
also provide preliminary evidence on the effects of specific infrastructure strategies, such as the 
distinction between access to general towns and access to fluvial ports, as well as on how the placement 
of roads would affect agricultural production. 
Given our strong priors about the importance of agriculture in the DRC, we unsurprisingly find 
highly significant and negative elasticities between travel times to sizable cities (50,000 or 100,000 
population), although we also find that these elasticities are small relative to those of similar cross-
country tests (Dorosh et al. 2009). Moreover, city access by itself is less important than access to cities 
and ports. Since this is potentially a very important finding insofar as it provides a partial answer to the 
“What kind of infrastructure?” question posed above, it behooves us to consider the theoretical merits of 
this finding in more detail.  
There are several significant reasons why access to fluvial ports is so important in the DRC. First, 
an individual port significantly broadens the scope of the market beyond the port city itself by connecting 
a farm to other cities through the DRC’s vast river network. Indeed, the DRC river network—which 
extends about 23,000 kilometers—is around 12 times longer than the DRC’s paved road network (less 
than 2,000 kilometers). Second, because of historical patterns of population settlement and the traditional 
advantages that river trade has in comparison to trade via a very weak road network, well over half of the 
DRC’s 40-odd cities with populations of 50,000-plus lie on one of the navigable rivers (the Congo River). 
Third, practically all of the rivers in question not only flow into the largest market (Kinshasa) but also 
into the DRC’s only international maritime port.  
So given this apparent network scale advantage, it is perhaps not surprising that access to fluvial 
ports has an even larger statistical association with agricultural production than does city access alone. 
Nevertheless, the trade potential of the river network is limited by several factors. First, it is obviously not 
possible for a port on one river to access ports on unconnected rivers, so trade patterns follow the natural 
course of the river, whereas road networks are far less constrained by such natural barriers. Second, river 
transport is very slow. According to Minten and Kyle’s (1999) findings for average Kinshasa traders, “A 
complete cycle by road takes 4 days to travel, 3 days to gather and buy the products, and 2 days to sell 
them while a cycle on the river lasts much longer: 20 days on the river, 10 days for gathering, and 3 days 
for selling.” Moreover, Minten and Kyle’s survey revealed that although river transport appears to be 
about one-third cheaper than road transport, losses for river transport are quite high, presumably because 
of the long duration of river journeys. 
Hence, river travel is suitable only for relatively nonperishable goods. However, one way of 
increasing the potential for agricultural trade on the DRC river networks could be to promote 
agroprocessing in river ports. This would not only reduce the perishability of agricultural produce, it 
would also facilitate employment growth and nascent industrialization. Informal communication with 
DRC policymakers also suggests that there is considerable scope to reduce river travel times, perhaps by 
as much as 50 percent. It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer more rigorous evidence on how much 
weight the DRC government should place on river transport rehabilitation versus road rehabilitation, but 
several further points are worth mentioning. First, roads and rivers are symbiotic. Even our own results 
relate to road-based travel times to ports, so we are implicitly exploring this synergy. This should remind 
us that it is improving the efficiency of the infrastructure network as a whole that is important—
improving the road and river networks by themselves and linking them up in better ways are vital means 
to achieving that goal.  
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Another question we have not directly touched upon is, “Who will benefit from increased trade 
and production?” Obviously, if production increases then farmers will benefit, provided that prices do not 
decline. However, lower transport costs should generally lead to higher prices being paid to farmers 
(which is a leading factor inducing the production increase in the first place). So the real question is not 
whether farmers will benefit but how substantially they will benefit. Given how vast the country is, there 
is not yet enough evidence to comprehensively answer this question, but indicative information is 
provided by two recent studies on transportation costs in agriculture trade, mostly in western DRC. The 
first piece of evidence from GRET (2004) relates to the distribution of income along the agricultural value 
chain. In the GRET study, the authors found that transporters obtain the majority of the income along the 
value chain, consistent with the very high transport costs observed in the DRC (Table 14). On average, 
farmers captured just over 20 percent of the overall income for cassava and 27.5 percent for maize.  
However, the second study by Rodriguez, Chinamula, and Mboso (2004) uses a comparative 
approach to show that farmers should substantially benefit from road rehabilitation. Two cities (Kokodia 
and Kenge) that are both 280 kilometers from the capital city of Kinshasa were chosen in Bandundu and 
Bas-Congo, two provinces bordering Kinshasa. The city of Kokodia is on the National 1, which has been 
rehabilitated recently, while Kenge is on the National 2, which is in very bad shape. Because the 
differences in distance are the same, the difference in road quality will be the primary factor explaining 
differences in market access. Consistent with this, the study found a 30 percent difference in transport 
costs between the two locations and Kinshasa and that the price of palm oil, which is much less perishable 
than cassava and maize, was the same across the two locations. As for the breakdown of the maize and 
cassava value chains, the study found that although wholesale prices on the Kokodia-Kinshasa route were 
almost double those of the Kenge route, Kokodia farmers nevertheless received maize and cassava prices 
that were 50–60 percent higher than those paid to farmers in Kenge (Table 15). On the basis of this 
evidence, it appears that even though middlemen or wholesalers substantially benefit from improved 
infrastructure, DRC farmers will also see their incomes increase because of changes in road infrastructure.  
Table 14. Shares of income along agricultural value chain in the DRC, 2000–2003 
Cassava   Maize 
Transport  Facilitator  Retailer  Farmer  Transport  Facilitator  Retailer  Farmer 
45.8%  4.2%  28.8%  21.2%  45.8%  4.2%  33.1%  27.5% 
Source: Ministère de l’Agriculture (2006). 
Table 15. Differences in agricultural prices and transport costs based on a natural experiment 
 
Kokodia in Bas-Congo 
(on paved road) 
Kenge in Bandundu 
(not on paved road) 
  Cassava  Maize  Palm oil  Cassava  Maize  Palm oil 
Storage  100  100    100  100   
Handling  200  200  20  200  200  20 
Taxes  200  200  50  200  200  50 
Other  500  500  100  1,600  1,800  100 
Transport cost  1,200  1,200  100  4,000  4,000  100 
Farm gate price  3,000  3,200  500  2,000  2,000  500 
Wholesale price  5,900  5,900  730  3,000  3,000  730 
Sum = retail price  11,100  11,300  1,500  11,100  11,300  1,500 
Benefit to farmers  1,000  1,200  0       
Benefit to wholesalers  2,900  2,900  0       
Benefit to retailers             
Source: Rodriguez, Chinamula, and Mboso (2004).  
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Finally, we looked at the important policy question of how alternative road investments could 
affect agricultural production. We drew two conclusions. First, among the alternative plans, the plan that 
includes an upgrading of feeder roads significant raised the rate of returns for agricultural production 
relative to upgrading main roads only. This is not surprising, given that main roads essentially connect 
major cities to one another, whereas feeder roads connect rural people to main roads and market towns 
(Dorosh and Schmidt [2008] find similar results in their study of Mozambique).  
However, a second finding is that the returns to agricultural production are very low relative to 
the costs of the roads. (Of course, this does not mean that the total benefit of roads will not be positive, 
because obviously much of the return will accrue to the nonfarm sector, especially the transport sector.) 
This is primarily because of the low elasticity between market access and agricultural production that we 
estimated for the DRC. Hence, we need to ask why these estimates are lower in the DRC than they are in 
the rest of Africa. We propose three explanations. First, urban incomes may be much lower in the DRC 
than in other African countries, thus weakening demand-side effects on agricultural production. 
Unfortunately, there is no reliable cross-country evidence on urban incomes, but Povcal data for average 
national incomes do not suggest that the DRC is significantly poorer than most other African countries, 
and urban poverty rates are certainly very high in Nigeria and other large African countries.  
A second explanation is that farmers in other African countries rely more on access to input 
markets, such as fertilizers and improved seeds. For crops such as cassava and maize in particular, the use 
of improved seeds is high in most African countries, but seems to be rather low in the DRC. And while 
chemical fertilizer use is low in much of Africa, it is virtually nonexistent in the DRC. This leads us to 
conclude that the estimated elasticities between production and market access capture only demand-side 
effects on agricultural production.  
A third reason for the gap may be estimate error. Despite our attempts to derive more country-
specific estimates of travel times for the DRC, anecdotal evidence indicates that the state of transport in 
the DRC is so dire that we could still have substantially underestimated travel times. Many roads may be 
roads in name only, and there are also substantial problems with the river transport system such that 
operating boats along large tracts of the system is simply physically impossible or economically 
unfeasible.  
The last point worth making is that the discussion above clearly highlights the fact that the 
agricultural returns to building roads are very much conditional upon other policies. If government 
policies can increase extension services and promote the adoption of modern inputs in the DRC, then 
more vibrant input markets could substantially increase the returns to new roads. If urban incomes 
continue to rise, then much of this incremental income will be spent on food, thus stimulating demand and 
opening up further trade opportunities. If agroprocessing facilities can be developed at fluvial ports, then 
this could greatly increase the scope for trade in nonperishable goods. All these factors should remind us 
that although roads and other types of infrastructure do indeed pave the way for development, their 
usefulness very much depends upon the broader economic environment. 
  
33 
APPENDIX A: THE SPATIAL PRODUCTION ALLOCATION MODEL (SPAM) FOR 
ESTIMATING CROP PRODUCTION 
We define our spatial crop allocation problem in a cross-entropy framework (You and Wood 2006). The 
first step is to transform all real-value parameters into a corresponding probability form. We first need to 
convert the reported harvested area, HarvestedAreajl for each crop j at input level l into an equivalent 
physically cropped area, CropAreajl., using cropping intensity. 
  jl jl jl tensity CroppingIn a HarvestAre CropArea / =
   (A.1) 
Let sijl be the area share allocated to pixel i and crop j at input level l with a certain country (say, X). Aijl is 






   (A.2) 
Let πijl be the prior area shares we know by our best guess for pixel i and crop j at input level l in country 
X. The modified spatial allocation model can be written as follows: 
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  (A.9) 
where: 
i : i = 1, 2, 3, …, pixel identifier within the allocation unit, and 
j : j = 1, 2, 3, …, crop identifier (such as maize, cassava, rice) within the allocation unit, and 
l : l = irrigated, rainfed—high input, rainfed—low input, subsistence, management and input levels 
for crops 
k : k = 1, 2, 3, …, identifiers for subnational geopolitical units  
J: a set of those commodities for which subnational production statistics exist 
L: a set of those commodities that are partly irrigated within pixel i  
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Availi: total agricultural land in pixel i, which is equal to total agricultural area estimated from land cover 
satellite images as described in section 2.  
Suitableijl: the suitable area for crop j at input level l in pixel i, which comes from FAO/IIASA suitability 
surfaces as introduced in section 2. 
IRRAreai: the irrigation area in pixel i from global map of irrigation 
The objective function of the spatial allocation model is the cross entropy of area shares and their 
prior. Equation (A.4) is the adding-up constraints for crop-specific areas. Equation (A.5) is the land cover 
image constraint that the actual agricultural area in pixel i from satellite images is the upper limit for the 
area to be allocated to all crops. Equation (A.6) is the constraint that the allocated crop area cannot exceed 
what is suitable for the particular crop. Constraint (A.7) sets the sum of all allocated areas within those 
subnational units with existing statistical data to be equal to the corresponding subnational statistics. 
Constraint (A.8) includes the irrigation information: the sum of all allocated irrigated areas in any pixel 
must not exceed the area equipped for irrigation indicated in the global map of irrigation (Siebert, Döll, 
and Hoogeveen 2001). The last equation, Equation (A.9), is basically the natural constraint of sijl as shares 
of total crop areas.  
Obviously, an informed prior (πijl) is very important for the success of the model. We create the 
prior based upon the available evidence. First, for each pixel, we calculate the potential revenue as 
  ijl ijl jl ij j ijl Suitable y Suitabilit Yield ice ice v × × × × = var Pr Pr Re
   (A.10) 
where Pricej and Yieldjl are the price index and the average yield for crop j at input level l (yield only) for 
the allocation unit (countries in Sub-Saharan Africa), and Suitabilityijl is the suitability for crop j at input 
level l and pixel i, which is represented as a proportion (value between 0 and 1) of the optimal yield. 
Pricevarij is the price variability (value between 0 and 1) for crop j and pixel i. Currently, we use the 
population density as an approximation for spatial price variation. Then we pre-allocate the available 














   (A.11) 
where Areaijl is the area pre-allocated to pixel i for crop j at level l, and Percentjl is the area percentage of 
crop j at input level l. For those geopolitical units without area statistics, we simply merge them together 
and obtain the total area for that merged unit by subtracting the sum of available subnational areas from 
the national total. After this pre-allocation, we calculate the prior by normalizing the allocated areas over 
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To convert the allocated crop areas into production, we need to consider both the broader 
production systems and the spatial variation within the systems. We first calculate an average potential 
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   (A.14)   
where Yieldjl is the statistical yield (from census data) for crop j in production system l. The production of 
crop j in production system l, and pixel i, Prodijl, could be calculated as the following:  
  Pr ( ) ijl ijl j ijl od A CroppingIntensity Y =××
   (A.15) 
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APPENDIX B:  SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES  
Table B.1. Results with the log of crop production per capita as the dependent variable 
Regression No.  C1  C2  C3  C4  C5  C6  C7 
Estimation method  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit 
               
Ln(travel time to 50K city)  -0.37***  -0.35***  -0.04         
               
Ln(travel time fluvial port)      -0.44***  -0.47***      0.013 
               
Ln(travel time to 100K city)          -
0.36**
* 
-0.34***  -0.48*** 
               
Ln(potential production, low 
inputs) 
0.18***  0.18***  0.18***  0.18***  0.18**
* 
0.18***  0.18*** 
               
Ln(100 km
2 pop. density)  -0.55***  -1.25***  -1.34***  -1.32***  -
0.54**
* 
-1.27***  -1.38*** 
               
Ln(100 km












               
Total observations  15,122  15122  15122  15136  15125  15125  15125 
Pseudo R-squared  0.125  0.126  0.127  0.127  0.125  0.125  0.127 
Territorial fixed effects  Yes  Yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes 
               
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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(km)  SECTION 
Length 
(km)  SECTION 
Length 
(km) 
Aeroport de Ndjili-Nsele  29  Kasomeno-Kasenga  61  Mpa-Nioki  57 
Akula-Gemena  115  Kasomeno-Lubumbashi  140  Mukulia-Lebia  34 
Bagata-Pinanga  44  Kasongo-Matala  129  Musango-Bulungu  61 
Bandundu-Mpoko  102  Kavumu-Minova  90  Mwenga-Burhale  71 
Batshamba-Riviere 
Loange  119  Kenge-Kikwit  310  Ndoluma-Beni  103 
Bendela-Bunkulu  13  Kikwit-Batshamba  89  Nguba-Likasi  61 
Beni-Kasindi  78 
Kinshasa (Cite verte)-
Aeroport de Ndjili  27  Niania-Komanda  286 
Besefe-Bokatola  22  Kisangani-Opala  3  Nioki-Bendela  80 
Bikoro-Besefe  60  Kisangani-Pene Tungu  100  Nsele-Kenge  203 
Boma-Matadi  1  Kisangani-Ubundu  117  Pene Tungu-Lubutu  132 
Boyabo-Libenge  18  Kisangani-Yangambi  89  Pinanga-Kutu  89 
Boyabo-Zongo  91  Komanda-Bunia  69  Pont Lulua-Kananga  12 
Boyamba-Mpa  39  Komanda-Erengeti  72 
Riviere Loange-
Tshikapa  122 
Boyamba/Mpa-Selenge  160  Kutu-Inongo  99  RN18 (Kinimi)-Bagata  104 
Boyasegbwe-Mobanza  57  Lac Mukamba-Mbuji Mayi  108  Rutshuru-Bunangana  24 
Bukavu-Kamanyola  43  Lebama-Tsebedin (RN209)  55  Tshikapa-Bulungu  161 
Bukavu-Kavumu  38  Lebia-Mambasa  103  Walikale-Masisi  124 
Bulungu-Pont Lulua  60  Likasi-Kambove  5  Weti-Besefe  71 
Bumba-Lisala  143  Likasi-Lubumbashi  126     
Bunduki-Bumba  119  Lisala-Akula  2     
Bunia-Mahagi  168  Lubumbashi-Kasumbalesa  90     
Burhale-Bukavu  51  Madula-Niania  312     
Businga-Lisala  190  Maloba-Kasongo  109     
Erengeti-Beni  50  Masisi-Sake  56     
Gemena-Boyabo  154 
Matadi-Kinshasa (Cite 
verte)  329 
 
 
Gemena-Karawa  71  Matala-Mwenga  198     
Goma-Ndoluma  227  Mbandaka-Ingende  138     
Inongo-Weti  88  Mbau-Kamango  61     
Kabinda-Maloba  258  Mbuji Mayi-Kabinda  161     
Kalamba-Bikoro  48  Mbuji Mayi-Mwene Ditu  120     
Kamanyola-Uvira  78  Minova-Sake  18     
Kananga-Lac Mukamba  85  Mogalo-Bari  47     
Karawa-Boyasegbwe  14  Mombanza-Businga  13     
Kasenyi-Bunia  42  Mongata-Bandundu  235     
Source: Rdc-humanitaire (2009).  
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Table B.3. Major road sections upgraded to asphalt for the scenario of the comprehensive plan 
SECTION 
Length 
(km)  SECTION 
Length 
(km)  SECTION 
Length 
(km) 
Aeroport de Ndjili-Nsele  29  Kasomeno-Lubumbashi  140  Ndu-Bondo  192 
Aketi-Bunduki  75  Kasongo-Matala  130  Nguba-Likasi  61 
Akula-Gemena  119  Kasumbalesa-Sakania  126  Niania-Komanda  290 
Banana-Moanda  7  Kavumu-Minova  90  Nsele-Kenge  203 
Baraka-Fizi  35  Kenge-Kikwit  310  Opala-Otala  131 
Batshamba-Riviere Loange  119  Kikwit-Batshamba  89  Osekola-Lodja  212 
Beni-Kasindi  74  Kilwa-Kasomeno  200  Oso-Walikale  107 
Boma-Matadi  234 
Kinshasa (Cite verte)-
Aeroport de Ndjili  27  Otala-Ikela  49 
Boma-matadi  7  Kisangani-Opala  215  Pene Tungu-Lubutu  132 
Bondo-Buta  199  Kisangani-Pene Tungu  100  Pont Bukama-Nguba  257 
Boyabo-Libenge  18  Komanda-Erengeti  72 
Pont Lubilashi-Pont 
Bukama  389 
Bukavu-Kamanyola  43  Lac Mukamba-Mbuji Mayi  108  Pont Lulua-Kananga  12 
Bukavu-Kavumu  38  Likasi-Lubumbashi  126  Pweto-Kilwa  132 
Bulungu-Pont Lulua  60  Lisala-Akula  171 
Riviere Loange-
Tshikapa  122 
Bumba-Lisala  143  Lodja-Lukibu  200  Sake-Goma  25 
Bunduki-Bumba  119  Lubumbashi-Kasumbalesa  90  Tele-Kisangani  222 
Burhale-Bukavu  51  Lubutu-Oso  87  Tshikapa-Bulungu  161 
Buta-Tele  94  Lukibu-Mashala  60  Uvira-Baraka  83 
Dulia-Aketi  48  Madula-Niania  316  Uvira-Makungu  2 
Erengeti-Beni  64  Makungu-Kalemie  140  Walikale-Hombo  83 
Fizi-Makungu  122  Maloba-Kasongo  109     
Gemena-Boyabo  154  Mashala-Mwamba Mbuyi  119     
Goma-Ndoluma  232 
Matadi-Kinshasa (Cite 
verte)  329     
Hombo-Miti  75  Matala-Mwenga  198     
Ikela-Isunguma  104  Mbuji Mayi-Kabinda  162     
Isunguma-Osekola  16  Mbuji Mayi-Mwene Ditu  120     
Kabinda-Maloba  258  Minova-Sake  18     
Kalemie-Pweto  389  Moanda-Boma  95     
Kamanyola-Uvira  102  Mwene Ditu-Pont Lubilashi  95     
Kananga-Lac Mukamba  85  Mwenga-Burhale  71     
Kananga-Mbuji Mayi  3  Ndoluma-Beni  105     
Source: Rdc-humanitaire (2009). 
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Table B.4. Crop prices  
Crop  Price (US$/kg) 
Beans  488.3   
Cassava  294.5   
Coconuts  101.8   
Coffee  428.4   
Cotton  535.3   
Groundnuts  363.9   
Maize  213.2   
Millet  502.1   
Palm kernels  125.0   
Palm oil  452.8   
Plantains  98.6   
Potatoes  361.2   
Rice  161.5   
Sorghum  313.8   
Soybeans  80.8   
Sugarcane  120.7   
Sweet potatoes  115.7   
Wheat  167.4   
Barley  115.3  (South Africa) 
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